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Stories of narrative research 
When we were first asked to contribute a chapter to this volume, we thought this 
would be a good opportunity for us to bring together our views on narrative research 
under one umbrella.  As Co-directors of the Centre for Narrative Research, we have 
been involved in on-going conversations with one another for a long time about 
narrative theory and method; these conversations have taken on a number of different 
formats, including an edited book (Andrews et al. 2000). These conversations have 
not, of course, been only amongst ourselves, but have also been stimulated by input 
from the wide array of people who have contributed to the activities of our centre, for 
instance by giving a presentation in, or by attending our speakers’ series and/or 
narrative workshops.   
 
Perhaps it should not have surprised us that when we sat down to plan the chapter, we 
realized that there was not one, but several different stories we wanted to tell, and that 
each of us had not only different areas of research, but indeed had come to narrative 
work through quite different paths.  We considered trying to find the commonality 
amongst us, and to write from this position, but ultimately we came to feel that much 
would be lost through such a homogenizing process.  Even embarking on an attempt 
to arrive at a robust shared definition of 'narrative' would, we decided, divert us from 
what was most interesting about the work itself. Rather, we concluded that it was not 
only admissible but even appropriate that a chapter on narrative in a book on research 
practice should be organized around our own stories of our relationship with narrative 
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research.  For while we share a general interest in narrative work, this has found very 
different expression in each of our lives, as the passages below document.  But be the 
topics of interest political engagement, divorce disputes, HIV support networks, or 
Foucaldian genealogies, our stories are not unconnected to each other. Indeed, we 
have worked so closely together over a number of years that it would be surprising if 
we were not present in each others’ accounts.  Thus, using our own stories as vehicles 
for exploring more general principles relating to narrative research, the chapter is 
organized around the themes of life stories and narrative (Andrews), narrative and 
subjectivity (Day Sclater), narrative genre (Squire) and autobiographical narratives 
(Tamboukou).  
 
Living Counter-narratives – Molly Andrews 
In the Introduction to Robert Jay Lifton’s deeply thoughtful and moving book about 
Nazi doctors, he remarks: “My assumption from the beginning, in keeping with my 
twenty-five years of research, was that the best way to learn about Nazi doctors was to 
talk to them” (1986: 6). ).  I have spent the last two decades talking with, and listening 
to, people telling me stories about their lives. Intuitively, I have always been drawn to 
stories which lie in tension with the ones which we are socialized to expect; only very 
recently have I begun to theorize these as ‘counter-narratives’ (Andrews, 
forthcoming).  
 
My doctoral dissertation was an exploration of lifetime commitment to progressive 
politics, and for three years I listened to many stories told to me by fifteen women and 
men between the ages of seventy and ninety, all of whom had been politically active 
on the left for fifty years or longer (Andrews, 1991).  Old age, far from representing 
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the disengagement and depression of which we so often hear, was for these men and 
women a very full moment in their lives, a continuation of all which they had been 
fighting for.  In fact, I was told, increased age, far from being an excuse to focus in 
upon the self, had instead the advantage of perspective.  Old peace activists were 
critical to social movements because they were less susceptible to becoming 
depressed through lack of immediate tangible results.  Social historian Peter Laslett 
comments upon this: 
It could be claimed… that many more duties of older people go forward in 
time than is the case in those who are young.  This follows from the fact that 
they owe less to their own individual futures – now comparatively short – and 
more to the future of others – all others… In this the elderly of any society can 
be said to be the trustees of the future (1989: 196). 
As one of my respondents, Eileen, explains to me: “It’s the old people who keep 
going. I think age brings that perspective.”  Trevor Huddleston echoes this sentiment. 
Speaking in 1987, he tells me: ‘I think I’ve become more revolutionary every year 
I’ve lived. And certainly now, because life is so much sorter. I mean I want to get 
apartheid dead before I’m dead. There’s no time to do that.’ That he would indeed 
outlive apartheid, and return to South Africa as the honoured guest of Nelson 
Mandela, was beyond his greatest dreams. And yet it was something to which he 
dedicated the whole of his being, and had done so for more than five decades.  
 
Although much of our conversations were not in storied form, some of it was.  
Elizabeth, for instance, was a great weaver of tales, and often would use dreams to 
introduce a description of an event or even of a psychological state of mind.  At one 
point in our interviews, Elizabeth describes the mounting pressure on her, as she 
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attempts to balance her responsibilities at home (with four children to look after) with 
her political commitments. She realizes that if she chooses to participate in a 
particular protest, she will risk being arrested, being put in prison, and thus unable to 
attend to her family’s needs. At this critical moment, she has a dream. 
I dreamed there was a tray and my hands were underneath holding the tray and 
I was doing a lot, what with the family and the famine relief and one thing and 
another. I was doing a lot, and more and more things were piled on this tray, 
and I said ‘Oh Lord, don’t put on anymore, I can’t hold it. And then I looked 
under the tray. It wasn’t my hands that were holding it, it was sort of symbolic 
hands, large thick hands that you get on Henry Moore sculptures.  And I knew 
that it wasn’t really me, that what I was doing was right, one was upheld in 
another dimension somehow… It was right, and it was go ahead.  
With the strength of the insights gleaned from this dream, this ‘fictional story’ as it 
were, Elizabeth decides to participate in the protest. In fact her worst fears are 
realized; she is arrested, and she spends three weeks in a maximum security prison. 
But she is mentally prepared for this possibility and is able to continue on.  Elizabeth 
uses the one story (of her dream) to frame the other; for her, they are deeply 
integrated into her concept of who she was and who she could become.   
 
I learned much from those conversations, and indeed continue to learn from them.  
Although the conversations (taped and ultimately transcribed) remain unchanged, I 
revisit them from time to time, and my understanding of them has evolved as I myself 
have changed.  For me, then, the stories continue to be reinvented as I hear them in 
different ways.  For instance, I recently wrote an article about the stories which these 
same women and men told me about their mothers. (Andrews, forthcoming).  But I 
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was not a mother at the time that I first heard these. Now, more fifteen years and two 
children later, I see in them layers which I did not, and probably could not have seen 
before. And so these stories continue to have life, indeed they become new stories, 
long after they have first been told. 
 
Having completed my Ph.D., I moved back to the United States, in August 1991, as 
the Gulf War erupted.  Having lived overseas for nearly five years, I had for some 
time begun to ask myself questions of what it meant to be an American living abroad. 
Now I wondered what it meant to be an American living in the heart of American 
militarism during wartime. It was in this context that I developed a project on 
patriotism (Andrews, 1997b).  I was prompted to do so, not only by the general 
context of the war, but by the sight of an American flag which adorned the anti-war 
24-7 vigil in downtown Colorado Springs, the most militarised place in the United 
States and where I was then living. I was curious what this flag meant to those who 
had planted it there.  But American flags were everywhere in Colorado Springs, not 
only at the peace vigil. What different meanings did this image carry for the many 
who displayed it?    
 
I interviewed a number of people with contrasting views on the war, most of whom 
had used the American flag as part of a means for expressing their feelings about the 
US military involvement.   One particular event, “One Hour for America,” featured in 
many of the accounts which I heard.  This event had been organized by some of the 
residents of Colorado Springs to show support for the war, and had raised a 
considerable sum of money for families of troops who lived locally.  The event, 
described by Hal, one of the key organizers, was intended as “a show of patriotism 
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and Americanism” and “a euphoria of those of us who have served in the military.”  
The event was held in the downtown area of the city, and attracted thousands.  
Everywhere one could see, there were American flags, large and small. Some people 
even had dressed as Old Glory, others as Uncle Sam.  Hal describes the “huge flags, 
fifty feet by fifty feet, hanging off of the buildings… what that means to you is 
freedom… There’s no symbol as strong as that American flag.” He himself “took 
three flags down [to the event]. I had them in both hands and I was just one of the 
crowd.” 
 
But some of the people who had been living at the anti-war vigil decided to attend this 
event, and their experience of that time was radically different. Mary describes her 
experience of the “Love America rally” as she terms it: 
There was so much intense hostility it was incredible ... you could just 
cut it with a knife... after the rally itself was over [people] lined up and 
you could see that they wanted to attack us and the police were there 
and they were kind of forming this barricade between us and the 
people at the parade... It was one of the most depressing moments I've 
had in a long time... they just wanted to sing louder and wave their 
flags faster every time they would look at us and spit. 
Despite the fact that anti-war protesters saw themselves as responsible citizens 
exercising their constitutional right to protest (and on those grounds exhibited 
the flag at their vigil) this symbol of America was used on occasion as a 
weapon against them.  As one of the peace protesters described to me in his 
interview: 
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There were a couple of times in which people with huge American 
flags tried to hit us over the head with the actual flag poles and sort of 
drape the flags over our heads ... there was another time when this 
pickup truck with some red necks stopped next to the vigil and they 
harassed us for a while and then they ran around us with their flag in a 
circle a few times. 
And yet, the American flag continued to wave on the grounds of the anti-war 
vigil. Far from being ‘unpatriotic’ or ‘un-American’, the peace protestors  saw 
themselves as making an essential contribution to the democratic process, and 
as such, doing their duty as ‘good citizens.’    
 
The third and final arena that I will use to describe my ongoing engagement with life 
histories and counter-narratives is that of East Germany.  In 1989, many Westerners 
viewed the acute political upheaval in East and Central Europe as a clear and 
straightforward victory for capitalism over socialism.  The Cold War had ended, and 
we had won; this seemed to be the interpretation which permeated reporting on these 
events in Western Europe and the United States.  But I was curious how those who 
lived through those changes regarded what had happened.  I decided to go and listen 
to the stories of those who had been involved in the underground citizen’s movement 
in East Germany. (See, for instance, Andrews 1997a, 1998, 1999, 2000).  Contrary to 
the "monolithic, mass unquestioning celebration" (Borneman, 1991:58) portrayed in 
the Western popular media, many leaders of the East German changes of 1989 
experienced deep agony, realizing  that they had "helped give birth to a child that 
quickly turned into a rather ugly creature" (Sebastian Pflugbeil quoted in Philipsen, 
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1993:161). As autumn turned to winter, they witnessed not the realization but the end 
of their dreams. 
 
Barbel Bohley, the so-called mother of the revolution, comments upon the 
capitalist triumphalism which followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
It was simply the revolt of the humiliated people.  And they did not ask why 
they revolted, for capitalism or socialism, they were simply fed up to live with 
this lie... Most certainly people did not go into the street and shout "we want 
capitalism." Deep down they wanted [to] change the system, change  their 
living conditions... it was not a victory for capitalism. 
Once again, I was confronted with stories which challenged the received 
narrative in the west.  Until I spent time in East Germany, I never knew that in 
the forty years of the existence of GDR, more than one million people 
immigrated to East Germany. Instead, one hears only of those who were killed 
by border guards in their desperate attempts to flee communism. Neither did I 
know about those East German political dissidents who were involuntarily 
exiled from their country, forced to spend time very much against their desires 
in some of the great cities of Western Europe. One such story came to me 
from Werner Fischer, one of the key leading dissidents of East Germany. It 
was amusing but also strange to listen to his tale of his months living in 
London. “I spent days in bed in London, so that time would pass quicker ...in 
London, one can study pure capitalism... I realized that if there is to be a 
change then it must be within the eastern bloc, there must not be a transition to 
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that system.” Living in the west for six months brought home to Fischer what 
instinctively he already knew, 
… I only realized … when I was in England that my roots were here 
[in the GDR], that I had become firmly rooted to this soil, here was the 
friction that sparked controversy.  I did not want to see the GDR 
disappear.  This is how many opposition members express it today: 
'better to have a stormy relationship than none at all.' 
Fischer tells a revealing story which occurred during his time in London. 
Describing his relationship with his Stasi interrogator, he tells me: 
… in a way I quite liked him.  In fact, they [the Stasi] chose the 
interrogators for every opposition member very carefully.  They knew 
our profiles and to whom we would respond… when I was in custody, 
he knew everything about me, whilst I knew nothing about him.  I 
could assess him by his appearance; I would notice that he had been to 
the barber, or that he was married. He had a wedding ring, and he 
loved wearing a new tie every day.  So much so, that when I was in 
London, I found myself browsing through Harrods’ tie department and 
choosing a tie for him. 
The image of Fischer – the man who later would be responsible for overseeing the 
disbanding of the Stasi – going about in Harrod’s, a symbol of capitalist opulence if 
ever there was one, mentally selecting a tie for his Stasi interrogator, speaks volumes.  
Here one can experience ‘up close’ the power of stories, for what Fischer conveys is 
not only revealing about himself, and his interrogator, and the relationship between 
them; through this seemingly innocuous detail, one gets a sense of how long the arms 
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of the Stasi really were, and why, even now more than a decade after its abolition, its 
spirit still haunts the land.   
 
Another image which has stayed with me from my many conversations in East 
Germany was that told me by Wolfgang Templin, the man once identified by 
Honecker as "the number one enemy of the state."  He, like Fischer and Bohley, had 
been exiled from East Germany, but unlike them, he went to West Germany, where he 
was still living in 1989.  I ask him what he did on the night the Berlin Wall fell.  He 
responds with great warmth: finally after nearly two years away, he was allowed to 
come home.  Fighting against the crowds pouring into the west, Templin made his 
way back into East Germany. 
...the fall of the Wall for me meant that I could go back into the GDR 
rather than get out of it.  And purely physically I experienced this - 
everybody pushing past me in the opposite direction and me pushing 
against the stream the other way.  I was overjoyed and it was in that 
mood that I re-entered the GDR... Two, three weeks later ... my family 
moved back here.   
November 9, 1989. The fall of the Berlin Wall. Celebrations, champagne, 
jubilation.  Finally able to return to one’s own country.  Finally able to return 
to East Germany.  The quintessential counter-narrative. 
 
I do believe that, indeed, we are storied selves, (Bruner, 1990; Eakin, 1999; 
McAdams, 1997; Rosenwald and Ochberg 1992; Sarbin, 1986); that there is a 
close relationship between the stories we tell and hear and who we are; and 
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that our stories are the cornerstone of our identities (Holstein and Gubrium, 
1999; Widershoven, 1993).  But I also think that this is no simple matter, as 
Shelley Day Sclater discusses below. Critically, our stories are not and can 
never be wholly personal.  Rather, we perceive reality in terms of stories, and 
ultimately how we construct, interpret, digest and recount for others our own 
experiences bears a strong relationship to the storylines which are already ‘out 
there.’  As a researcher, what has fascinated me most are those situations in 
which people fashion stories which challenge – either implicitly or explicitly – 
those master tales, revealing alternative versions of how those stories we know 
best might be retold.   
 
 
Narrative and Subjectvity – Shelley Day Sclater  
I spent many years of my life writing stories on behalf of other people. I was a family 
lawyer – dealing mostly with divorce, ‘domestic violence’ and ‘child care’ cases – 
before I changed focus and came to the academy in 1993. Part of my job was to listen 
to people’s stories and write them down – translating them into legal language, 
emphasising the parts law wanted to hear, and minimising (or deleting) the rest. Any 
lawyer will you that making out a good case for a client, is a fine art. Legal 
documents and submissions must include only material that is legally relevant. But, at 
the same time, the best evidence takes the form of persuasive stories that engage the 
reader, elicit sympathy and establish the moral rightness of the client’s case, whilst 
appearing to do nothing other than dispassionately report the ‘facts’ (see, for example, 
Jackson, 1990). 
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Doing the legal bit was easy enough, once you had some practice, and writing a 
persuasive tale soon became second nature. What was more difficult – and didn’t get 
much easier as the years went by - was persuading the client that sometimes the issues 
the client felt to be of vital importance had to be omitted. I discovered that people 
were wedded, often very deeply so, to their personal narratives and that it was 
sometimes impossible to prise apart the person from their story, even when judges 
made it perfectly clear that such-and-such was of no concern to them. This gulf 
proved to be a major source of stress for many people. It seemed that people needed 
to tell their stories and, more importantly, they needed to be heard – to have their 
feelings, and themselves, recognised. And they felt deeply wounded when the law 
simply refused to participate in any such validation process.  
 
It seemed that people habitually made deep emotional investments in their personal 
narratives, particularly when their lives had been disrupted by something like divorce. 
I saw people struggling to cope with various forms of ‘family breakdown’. In their 
stories they attempted to piece together the fragments of their lives and to make sense 
of what had happened. Those stories were often of desperation, for there were 
precious few positive cultural scripts available when it came to speaking about 
divorce. I saw also how little space there was in the legal process for acknowledging 
feelings of hurt, anger and grief – there was certainly no place at all for recrimination 
and destructiveness – but as a psychologist I knew that those feelings would not just 
disappear. I wondered about the role of law in relation to people’s coping – in denying 
these messy feelings, was the legal process helping or was it hindering?  
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Not long before I left legal practice, interest in ‘alternative’ forms of dispute 
resolution crystallised in the UK, and there were attempts to instate mediation as the 
preferred procedure. My initial reaction was one of interest – here, I thought, was a 
forum in which feelings could be acknowledged, and stories told and heard; surely 
everyone would benefit. I did a mediation training course and my illusions were 
quickly shattered. I discovered that mediation was, fundamentally, about changing 
people’s stories – ‘reframing’ the process is called. I found it deeply patronising. And 
it was ‘management’ – one of the ‘technologies of the self’ that Maria Tamboukou, 
drawing on Foucault’s work, talks about - that relied too heavily for my liking on 
accepted wisdom. The dominant discourses were being offered as templates for the 
construction of acceptable divorce stories. I began to see mediation as a dangerous 
proliferation of half-baked psychology being put in the service of social control and 
treasury savings.  
 
When I left legal practice and began life as an academic, it seemed natural to pursue 
research into divorce. A grant from the ESRC enabled me to study people’s 
experiences of different forms of dispute resolution. Part of my mission was to 
develop a new methodology for divorce work that could take account of 
psychological dynamics as well as social structures and cultural processes. It was 
during the long search for such a ‘psychosocial’ methodology that I encountered 
‘narrative’ in the social sciences– first in the form of Elliot Mishler’s seminal book on 
research interviewing (Mishler, 1986) and then, quite by chance, Catherine 
Riessman’s little book on ‘narrative analysis’ (Riessman, 1993). Mark Freeman’s 
Rewriting the Self (Freeman, 1993) and Jerome Bruner’s Acts of Meaning (Bruner, 
1990) were two other texts that were particularly significant on my journey as they 
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raised the issue of the ‘turn to narrative’ as a socio-historical formation. New to 
academia, it was a relief to find others grappling with the same kinds of 
preoccupations.  
 
I began my divorce work with a small pilot study in 1995 and wrote it up in several 
publications (Day Sclater 1995, 1997, 1998a, 2000). In this early work, I was clumsily 
feeling my way, trying to find the best means to get people to talk at length, always 
coming up against my own (lawyerish) tendency to ask too many questions, interrupt, 
guide the direction of talk, take sides, and so on. It was a painful learning process for 
me – good lawyers don’t necessarily make good research interviewers, I soon 
discovered. By the time I came to look in detail at the ‘data’ I had collected, vast 
numbers of questions were lining up in my ‘research log’. I was awestruck by the 
sheer volume of the material I had – and I hardly knew how to begin to ‘analyse’ it. 
There was no recipe book for narrative data analysis. But when I started looking at the 
transcripts, like Riessman (1990), I became interested in the patterns of the narratives 
that people were telling – ‘survivor’ stories, mostly – and the kinds of ‘selves’ that 
were being claimed in those stories. As I was interested in psychological processes in 
divorce, I wanted to find ways to focus more specifically on issues of self and identity 
in personal narratives.  
 
I began ‘reading’ the personal narratives for the identity claims in the stories. What 
was immediately striking was the way in which the stories seemed to speak a coherent 
identity that the subject had had to put together again after the trauma of separation or 
divorce. Hopper (2001) makes a similar point; selves are foremost among the issues 
that are contested and negotiated in divorce proceedings. A closer reading of the 
 15 
divorce stories I collected revealed, not coherence and continuity of self, but Humpty-
Dumpty-like fragments and partialities – sometimes inconsistent, contradictory even. 
The appearance of unity and coherence came from the narrative – or, in other words, 
the autobiographical genre provided a template for a continuing life and a coherent 
sense of self. What I was seeing were the narratives and ‘counter-narratives’ in life 
history work that Molly Andrews describes.  
 
Interestingly, too, the ‘personal’ narratives weren’t only ‘personal’. Not only did the 
stories draw on cultural scripts and the kinds of ‘genres’ that Corinne Squire talks 
about, but also they were also organised around discourses that participants invoked 
and used for their own ends. Moreover, these stories, and the identities participants 
constructed in those stories, took shape in an intersubjective space – in interaction 
with me as researcher, interviewer and, crucially, as other human subject. In the 
stories, too, selves were almost invariably fashioned in relation (usually in opposition) 
to the former partner - the anti-hero in the stories.  
 
My background in psychology and psychoanalysis, and my own experiences on the 
couch, predisposed me to think psychodynamically about narratives and selves. Much 
later, this orientation was to make me suspicious about what I recently heard the 
biographer Victoria Glendinning refer to as the ‘lies and silences’ of biography; and 
make me wary of being seduced by narrative (see, for example, the edited collection 
by Rhiel and Suchoff (1996) and Young-Bruehl (1998)). Phillips (1999) also reminds 
us that Freud was distrustful of biography. For Freud, in telling one story of one’s life, 
we simultaneously avoid telling any number of other stories, involving ourselves in 
denials, repressions and displacements. I am acutely conscious of these limitations as 
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I tell my own story, here. But at the time, I was more curious than critical. It seemed a 
commonplace that selves were constructed in stories (even ‘by’ stories), but I wanted 
to know why and how that should be. I found it very helpful at that stage to theorise 
the storied construction of self using Winnicott’s idea of ‘potential’ space (Day 
Sclater, 1998b). Stories, I argued, were of the order of ‘transitional phenomena’ – 
neither wholly objective, nor wholly subjective – they were creative spaces in which, 
as in infancy, selves could take shape again and again. I subsequently developed this 
work with Candida Yates and we explored the idea that narratives, circulating in 
culture, and taking particular forms, can be either facilitating or constraining for 
human potential and creativity (see Yates and Day Sclater, 2000). 
 
Thus began my preoccupation with the relationship between narrative and the self, 
and the problem of how specifically ‘psychological’ knowledge may be derived from 
personal narrative accounts. This issue was central in my ESRC-funded project on the 
Psychology of Divorce Dispute Resolution. This work was written up in several 
publications (see, for example, Brown and Day Sclater (1999), Day Sclater (1998c, 
1999a, 1999b), Day Sclater and Yates (1999)). Personal narratives were collected 
during long, unstructured conversations that were modelled on ‘life-history’ work. 
Psychological well-being was also assessed quantitatively using the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ). What was striking was a distinct lack of fit between the 
quantitative and the qualitative data we collected – the GHQ indicated deep and 
enduring psychological distress, but the narratives gave a much more nuanced picture.  
 
Most stories were ‘survivor’ stories. The majority spoke of the positive rebuilding of 
lives and selves shattered by divorce, evincing a determination to survive and a 
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growing strength to meet the challenge. These stories challenged prevailing dominant 
‘divorce as disaster’ images. But what was interesting was that these optimistic 
narratives could co-exist with others that were much less certain and more ambiguous, 
evincing an ambivalence that I came to see as characteristic of the divorce process. 
Comparison of the qualitative and the quantitative data helped me to understand 
divorce as a multilayered process in which the subject marshalled personal, relational 
and cultural resources to make sense of a past that had become other than it had been 
before, and to forge a new sense of self. Narrative reconstructions play a central part 
in that process, as past, present and future are all transformed. Comparison of the two 
types of data was also an object lesson in the different readings one can make of any 
‘data’.  
 
A nagging problem was how to derive some specifically ‘psychological’ data from the 
narratives. Here, we were treading on unfamiliar ground. At about the same time, 
Wendy Hollway and Tony Jefferson were grappling with a similar problem in their 
study of fear of crime. Their solution (see Hollway and Jefferson, 2000) was to posit a 
‘defended’ subject and to conduct interviews according to principles of ‘free 
association’ such that data analysis then revealed aspects of biographical experience 
framed in the language of psychoanalysis. Michele Crossley (2000), tackled a similar 
problem in a different way. She wanted to salvage something of psychology’s 
‘individual’ from what she saw as the ravages of postmodern thinking, and she 
wanted to locate that individual firmly as a ‘narrative’ subject. Her formulation of a 
‘narrative psychology’ took its place firmly within a social constructionist tradition.  
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For me, however, these kinds of ‘solutions’ raised more questions than they answered 
and more problems than they solved. I began to think that, if there is such a thing as a 
purely psychological realm of experience, then it was full of tensions, provisos, 
ambiguities and even contradictions – it was just not possible to ‘read off’ anything to 
do with psychology from the narrative interviews. It was tempting to immerse myself 
in semiotic theory to try to work it out (see, for example, Silverman, 1983), but the 
kind of tools I was looking for were not to be found there either. Later I was to come 
seriously to question whether there was such a thing as a psychological realm of 
experience, as distinct from the psychological (or social constructionist, or 
psychoanalytic) discourse we use to think about it.  
 
But I knew that my work could have policy implications and, for that reason, I 
persisted with the ‘psychological’ aspect of the analysis. I returned to an old interest - 
Althusser’s idea of ‘interpellation’ whereby subjects were ‘hailed’ and thereby 
constituted ‘ideologically’ (Althusser, 1971). Davies and Harré’s concept of 
‘discursive positioning’ (Davies and Harré, 1990) similarly suggested important links 
between the social and the individual. But many issues remained: was there anything 
‘behind’ the discursive and narrative choices people made? Why were some 
identifications more likely than others, some positions more desirable than others? 
These kinds of issues make some sceptical of the value of narrative. Frosh (1999), for 
example, asks what is ‘outside’ discourse, and falls back on an open-ended concept of 
‘the real’. Craib (2000) goes further and talks about narratives as ‘bad faith’.  
 
The question of research ethics also loomed large. The possibility of using the 
language of psychoanalysis to effect particular readings of the interview transcripts 
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was considered but rejected as potentially going beyond the ‘informed consent’ that 
participants give -, and potentially neglectful of the jointly-produced nature of the 
narratives. I wanted to avoid a ‘realist’ take on the unconscious that is implicit in 
much psychoanalytic discourse. I decided to work, not with the inner worlds of 
individuals, but with the structures of their stories - psychoanalytic ideas could 
usefully illuminate dimensions of the stories that might otherwise remain hidden. 
Read in this way, the stories revealed ambivalences and polarisations that were 
theorised with reference to Klein’s notion of ‘splitting’ and the vacillations between 
‘depressive’ and ‘paranoid-schizoid’ positions in the wake of the trauma of divorce. 
In this way, I was able to move from the narratives to say something about the 
psychological processes in divorce, and the ways in which they were played out in 
dispute resolution. 
 
I have subsequently embarked on a narrative study of seemingly intractable disputes 
between divorcing people over their children, funded by the Leverhulme Trust. The 
project is still ongoing. The focus so far has been on what happens at the limits of 
law. Litigants who occupy entrenched positions explain their actions in moral terms 
and the most significant feature of parents’ talk is the way in which their negotiations 
of moral positions take a narrative form. Rights-talk no longer has any currency in 
family law, but for parents themselves, taking part in a contact dispute is clearly about 
making or resisting a moral claim. But participation in litigation obliges parents to 
position themselves in relation to a range of discourses that explicitly exclude ‘rights’. 
Parents’ narratives reveal interesting tensions around ‘rights’ and ‘welfare’; verbal 
performances of the acceptable ‘welfare’ discourse are common, sitting uneasily 
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alongside other competing discourses, including rights-talk. Disputing parents are 
adept at reframing their claims to ‘rights’ as welfare issues.  
 
I am now focussing more on theoretical work – in particular the relations between 
narrative and subjectivity. I have become quite circumspect about the proposition that 
selves are narratively constructed. Instead, I want to ask other questions about the 
nature of subjectivity, and the nature of narrative, and what it means to say that 
subjectivities and identities are negotiated in stories. I don’t want to lose sight of the 
fact that subjectivities are embodied (see, for example, Curti (1998), Smith (1993) 
and, after Butler (1990, 1993), gendered and performative. And I want to reassert the 
importance of material social practice. My current preoccupation is to formulate both 
‘narrative’ and ‘subjectivity’ in processual terms – narration as embodied practice and 
subjectivity as many-layered always-becoming in the matrices of culture (see Day 
Sclater, 2001a,b). 
 
Narrative analysis, for me, is not only a way of finding out about how people frame, 
remember and report their experiences, but is also a way of generating knowledge, 
that disrupts old certainties and allows us to glimpse something of the complexities of 
human lives, selves and endeavours. It illuminates not only individual lives but also 
broader social processes (see Rustin, 2000). Narrative analysis, as an interdisciplinary 
practice that cuts across the arts, humanities, sciences and social sciences, is also a 
useful corrective to the reductive tendencies that other analyses, rooted in individual 
disciplines, can manifest. It opens up some very exciting possibilities for thinking 
about creativity in relation to research and it provides a very rich source for theory-
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building – read any stretch of narrative text and remind yourself how many important 
questions there are still to be asked! 
 
 
Narrative Genres – Corinne Squire 
Stories, some researchers say, are rooted in human agency. A story is told by 
someone, although that person may not know everything about the story they are 
telling. In such accounts, narrative analysis is a kind of compromise between 
modernism and postmodernism. Stories change over time, and the language of stories 
constructs our subjectivities; but we are all, nonetheless, active and effective 
storytellers. In performing narratives we can create new possibilities for identities and 
actions (Bruner, 1990; Mishler, 1986).  
 
Unsurprisingly, given that HIV threatens physical, personal and social agency, this 
perspective has been popular in HIV research. The relation of particular stories to the 
mental and physical health of people with HIV has been explored (Crossley, 1997; 
Ezzy, 2000; Schwartzberg, 1993). More generally, much research enables people with 
HIV to tell their own stories, a sort of corrective to the prevailing pathologisation of 
the HIV 'story.'  And so when in the mid-1990s I began a longitudinal study in Britain 
of people's experiences, expectations and requirements of HIV support, I considered 
doing a biographical analysis of the many stories that people told. 
 
The difficulty with this perspective, for me, is that it understands stories as having, 
despite their multiplicity, a fixed, human pattern, and frequently claims to know what 
is a good, healthy story or a bad, maladaptive one. This perspective's emphasis on a 
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purposive, agentic subject is also often at odds with the fragmented, indeterminate 
subject underlying its more flexible concept of  'stories.' My own findings from the 
HIV support study, and that of some other HIV researchers (Ciambrone, 2001; Squire, 
1999) suggest that the storytelling 'subject' in these cases is a diverse, strategic entity, 
that stories cannot necessarily be related to universal narrative forms and that it is 
invidious to judge the psychological value of individuals' stories. People's stories do 
not always show progressive adaptation over time for instance.  Apparent 'regressions' 
cannot always be related clearly to health or other life crises. For women living with 
HIV, as well as people living with the condition in difficult social or political 
circumstances, for instance as refugees, a story that develops increasingly consistent 
and coherent notions of identity is exceptional rather than exemplary (Squire, 1999).   
 
There are other ways to read stories. We can, for instance, approach narrative analysis 
outside of a developmental or teleological frame. We can treat 'story' as an important 
but culturally variable 'discourse,' that is, a Foucauldian formation of meaning and 
power with significant but hard-to-determine effects (Parker, 1992).  From this 
perspective, the storyteller is not a unitary self, making holistic sense of his/her life in 
the telling. Instead, the stories that people tell about themselves are about many 
selves, each situated in particular contexts, and working strategically to resist those 
contexts. When analysing the HIV support study interviews, I realised that this 
analytic frame fitted the stories better than any attempt to turn them into unified 
biography. When for instance Katherine (not her real name), an HIV positive woman 
of African origin, told of her current ease with HIV, her 'acceptance' of it, this 
accepting 'self' was not an independent or stable construct, but a reiterated, 
strategically resistant moment within a long story about her and her friends' attempts 
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to engage with and then appropriate a medical expertise that defined them as virus 
carriers.  When Katherine told of her newfound empowerment in demanding services, 
she narrated this 'self' as the resistant coda to a story about social service positionings 
of her as a 'client.' When she described her desire to break free and do all the things 
she wanted to do, this emergent 'self' was situated, again, as a strategic resistance, 
within a story of her long-term volunteering and work around HIV (Squire, 1999). 
 
Genre analysis is an emblematic example of the narrative-analytic practice described 
above. Genres, subtypes of narrative with distinctive structures and contents, are 
clearly socially and culturally constructed forms. That is why, if you share a genre's 
cultural matrix, you will know it when you see it (Todorov, 1990).  Within western 
cultures some genres - romance, tragedy, comedy and irony - have wide currency 
(Jacobs, 2000), but genres shift and intermingle all the time. The heterogeneity and 
fractures within genres also mean that they undermine themselves constantly 
(Derrida, 1992). Within western cultures, the term 'genre' has been applied to visual 
arts that take the everyday as their subject, and to varieties of popular fiction. This 
indicates the cultural promiscuity that must inform genre analysis; for genres are 
relatively similar between 'high' and 'low' culture and across media (Todorov, 1990). 
To address these phenomena, a genre analysis may need to pay attention as much to 
cultural and media studies as to social science research (For other examples, see 
Squire, 1994, 1998, forthcoming). 
 
Within the UK HIV support study, two genres appeared with striking frequency. One 
was a 'coming out' story that mirrored lesbian and gay coming out narratives, moving 
from uneasy realisation of a problem (illnesss, positive status) through denial, to anger 
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and depression, into an acceptance that often took the initial form of very active 
engagement with HIV's medical and social context but that later became a more low-
level incorporation of HIV within personal and cultural identities. This 'coming out' 
story of HIV had been noted by the cultural theorist Cindy Patton (1990); some gay 
men in the study themselves noted the parallels. Here, it was told not just by gay men, 
but by heterosexual women and men, for whom it seemed to be an accessible and 
appropriate cultural resource, addressing as it does the relationship of subjectivity to 
stigma (Squire, 1999) As with lesbian and gay coming out stories (Sedgewick, 1990), 
this story did not claim to be closed, to contain everything (Frosh, 1999); it had space 
for imperfection and abjection. Coming out as lesbian or gay, or as HIV positive, is 
never going to be a completed, or a completely comfortable, endeavour. Thus the 
genre enabled the articulation of an identity that is empowering, but not fixed or 
imprisoning, through its optimistic yet pragmatic engagement with stigma. 
 
The other genre that appeared with great frequency in the talk of some women with 
HIV was that of heterosexual romance.  It was hard to ignore this genre, since it often 
took over much of an interview; some women explicitly noted these stories’ apparent 
deviation from the 'support' topic. The romance genre spoke against HIV's fatality, 
through the living-happily-ever-after and reproductive ideals at which it aimed. Yet 
these were also specific, HIV romances, structured by the limits that the condition 
places on the genre.  Again, HIV romance seemed, for women, a genre with space 
enough inside it for them to narrate failures, often many and desolate, in their quest 
for heterosexual love and for their own acceptance of their status, yet to continue their 
stories after them (Squire, 1999; forthcoming). 
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One criticism of genre analysis in the HIV context is that it denies the affective 
continuities and development of people's stories. Does it, perhaps, fail to connect with 
the emotional weight of biography, which lies 'under' genre's surface structures?  It is 
undoubtedly true that an HIV diagnosis has deep and longlasting psychological as 
well as medical and social implications. However, representation has played such a 
big role in forming personal and political pictures and policies around HIV, and is 
perceived as important by people living with the condition. It could be argued, 
consequently, that their uses of particular genres are highly biographically 
meaningful. In the study, many interviewees wanted urgently to tell their stories, and 
the narrative resources available for personal public storytelling were pressing issues.  
It is important to recognise, too, that a 'life story' is not a universal form, but a genre 
(Squire, 2000). There are culturally and historically specific rules about how we 
should autobiographise ourselves, which my study failed deliberately to mobilise, 
since to do so, to ask people to tell me about their 'lives,' would, in this case, have 
reduced 'life' to 'HIV.'  Instead the study asked people about support, and in the 
process, it mobilised the other genres I have mentioned.  
 
Were the genres artefacts of the questions asked? Perhaps the general developmental 
course of engagement and disengagement with HIV support produces a 
developmental 'coming out' story.   Perhaps chronic illness experience itself impels 
biographical reconstruction (Bury, 2001). The 'coming out' subgenre of  biography is, 
however, specific in its engagement with stigma and uncertainty. Again, women 
interviewees told HIV romances regardless of what questions were being asked. Nor 
is romance women's preferred biographical genre. HIV romance seemed to be specific 
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to these women's gendered struggles with the physical, reproductive and relationship 
consequences of  seropositivity. 
 
In 2001, I also investigated HIV support in another geographical, economic and 
political place within the pandemic: townships around Cape Town, South Africa. This 
study again collected interviews that were full of stories. In Africa, where silence 
about or 'othering' of HIV (Joffe, 1997) have until recently been political and personal 
norms, the narrative resources that people have available to them around HIV are, as 
in the west, key issues. (Galavotti et al., 2001). The significance of such resources 
was magnified for many of these particular research participants by the convergence 
of  their stigmatised HIV positive status with unemployment, poverty and curtailed 
education.   It seemed in this context that an array of genres were being mobilised to 
tell HIV stories, as in earlier and more apparently urgent days of the epidemic in the 
west (Crimp, 1988; Murphy and Poirier, 1993) These genre appropriations were 
highly persuasive for speakers and those who listened to them. Describing them 
seemed a relevant research focus at a time when the many voices of people infected 
and affected by HIV in the country were starting to gain a hearing. 
 
South African interviewees often used a 'talkshow' model of talking about difficult 
events, telling stories about how they came to accept and disclose their status so that 
others would benefit, the whole issue would be out in the open, and they could live 
their lives proudly and positively, in both senses of the word. Sometimes this genre 
appropriation was explicit; interviewees said there needed to be more talk about HIV, 
'like on Ricki (Lake)'. This 'Oprification' genre, and its female identifications, has 
specific significance when it is adopted, as here, within a nation with some cultural 
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traditions as well as a recent political history around HIV that emphasises silence  - 
especially for women - and in a situation where stigmatised HIV positive status often 
converges with unemployment, poverty and curtailed education. In these 
circumstances the Oprification disclosure genre might have empowering gendered 
and social effects. It is important that this genre does not become a coercive model, 
forcing people to disclose. But it is, like the coming-out genre, an open form. It does 
not claim to say everything about a person, or to take the same path for every speaker. 
This incompleteness preserves its emancipatory potential. 
 
Many interviewees also seemed to draw on a religious genre of conversion and 
witnessing in talking about their initial HIV denial; their later acceptance of their 
status which often appeared in the stories as a sudden, life changing moment; and 
their evangelical attempts afterwards to help themselves and others live positively 
with HIV. This religious genre might be expected when faith was so important for the 
interviewees, many of whom spent large parts of Sunday in worship and some of 
whom devoted most of their week to religious activities.  But it had the effect of 
turning stories about HIV, that previously must be silenced or whispered, into literal 
'morality tales,' ethico-political endeavours.  
 
'Speaking out' is also a kind of nation-building genre in South Africa, one with a long 
political history. Most recently displayed in the country's saturation with stories from 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Walker and Unterhalter, 2001), it is more 
widely exhibited through the increasing volume and multiplicity of voices heard in the 
country since the end of apartheid, and is foreshadowed in the long preceding struggle 
for an effective voice for the majority of the population. Nkosi Johnson, the HIV 
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positive child who told his story to the International AIDS Conference in 2000, spoke 
as a direct descendent both of the recent TRC storytelling and of that much longer 
struggle to have your voice heard. Realising the power of this association, the main 
South African HIV activist group, the Treatment Action Campaign, placed an image 
of Johnson, who had recently died, next to the famous picture of Hector Peterson, the 
13 year old killed in the Soweto uprisings of 1976, on campaign posters. Interviewees, 
who also spoke to us in the period just after Johnson's death, occasionally used his 
public storytelling explicitly as a model for their own speaking out.    More generally, 
speaking out about HIV has become a new field of political activism, the latest move 
in the trajectory of South Africa's revolutionary political history. But this politicised 
route to talking about HIV is not easily available to all. The direct and indirect effects 
of the liberation struggle and the TRC must be set against the still-powerful legacy of 
apartheid, both in creating the economic, educational and political context of the 
South African epidemic, and more specifically in constraining people's hearing and 
telling of tales of personal and political resistance to HIV.i 
 
Genre is, of course, a co-constructed category. Talking to people with HIV as a white, 
university-employed, negative-status woman has particular effects on interview data. 
The situation is further complicated when interviewees are of a different nationality, 
inhabit communities where English is not usually a first language, and live in informal 
settlements. In South Africa, too, two-thirds of the interviews were conducted with 
graduate or undergraduate co interviewers and translators. While genre is always fluid 
and negotiable, it is important to recognise that in such circumstances, analysis of 
what genres are in play must be pursued collaboratively  -in this case, with co 
interviewers, and by checking with interviewees themselves.  
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I would suggest that these circumstances of translation and potential research 
'colonisation' do not make genre analysis impossible, but clarify its limitations 
(Andrews, 1995). They also point to one further advantage of genre analysis: its 
accessibility and meaning for research participants. If analyses of their stories are a 
good means of reflexively engaging interviewees, so too are accounts of the particular 
kinds of stories they tell, accounts which, moreover, position them - as indeed they 
are - as creative interpreters and constructors of their places within cultures. In this 
respect, genre analysis is an exemplary instance of the narrative approach's interest in 
what people do, representationally, with their lives, how they remake events and 
experiences into their lived cultures, and at times use this remaking to live differently. 
 
 
Autobiographical narratives: a genealogical approach – Maria Tamboukou 
 
 
My interest in Foucault coincided with a critical period in my life, when, dislocating 
myself from familiar spaces and places, I had felt the need to experiment with new 
modes of thinking and perhaps with new modes of being. It was the early nineties and 
I had come to London to make a new start. In following Foucault, I think that I had 
become passionately interested in a wider shift in the European intellectual landscape: 
the return of ethics as a primary issue in the philosophical agenda. It is through my 
particular interest in ethics that I have attempted to excavate the ways people and 
particularly women have acted upon themselves so as to create a stylistics of life, 
become ethical subjects, become what they are. It was in the Foucauldian framework 
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that the initial question of a doctoral research project was formulated: What is the 
present of women in education today? How have we become what we are and what 
are the possibilities of becoming other?  
 
Drawing on trails of the Foucauldian genealogy, I turned to the past, so that I could 
trace hidden practices and unnoticed contours intertwined in the conditions that made 
a cluster of various subject positions available for woman teachers to inhabit. Doing 
genealogy involves focusing on insignificant details, searching in the maze of 
dispersed grey and dusty documents to trace discontinuities, recurrences and play 
where traditional research sees continuous development, progress and seriousness. In 
the process of my inquiries, I have therefore wondered where I should look for those 
traces, those ‘grey meticulous details’, the forgotten documents that genealogy is 
after. This is how I became interested in women teachers’ texts of self-representation. 
Reading their forgotten diaries, letters, autobiographies and memoirs has offered me 
invaluable experience of genealogical research and has helped me make sense of how 
‘through autobiographical writing the self is written out of and into its historical 
context’ (Steedman, 1992:14) and how this very practice of writing is interwoven in a 
critical technology of the self.  
 
In using genealogy as a tool for exploring the female self in education, I stabilised 
moments in the latest part of the nineteenth century and the earliest part of the 
twentieth century in the UK as strategically chosen starting points  for my inquiries. 
Women’s mass involvement in education has of course been the object of numerous 
and important historical studies, that have often attempted to find a place for it in a 
supposedly linear historical development of women’s liberation (see Purvis, 1991). 
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However, in the genealogical analysis, this linear development towards progress has 
been interrogated and problematized. In paying attention to the ‘minor’ pathways and 
processes surrounding the historical highway that has supposedly led women to the 
public sphere, different story-lines were able to emerge, while dissonances have often 
disrupted the melody of feminist history. In focusing on the context of the fin-de-
siècle era, I did not try to recover the woman teacher as a heroic figure of social 
history. I attempted an analysis of the specification of her emergence in a nexus of 
signifying genealogical events.   
 
In therefore taking up genealogical analytical trails I chose to follow life narratives  lives 
of the first women who attempted to navigate the difficult ways of forming a new self in 
the various new educational institutions, both as students and later teachers. These 
women have often been represented in quite contradictory and often juxtaposing ways: 
either as lady heroes, the legendary pioneers of women’s education or as agents of 
oppression, reproducing feminine ideals and middle class ideologies in the newly opened 
sphere of women’s education (see Prentice and Theobald, 1991). Instead of being 
confusing, these contradictions have indeed been highly relevant to the genealogical 
project. As a genealogist of the female subject I was particularly intrigued to look more 
carefully not only at the surrounding discourses, but also at the discourses of women 
themselves, their autobiographical narratives through which they made sense of their 
lives. In bracketing the gaze and discourses of the ‘others’, I wanted to concentrate on 
their own processes of subjectification, using the genealogical device of the technologies 
of the self. These technologies of the self, according to Foucault, ‘permit individuals to 
effect, by their own means, or with the help of others a certain number of operations on 
their own bodies, and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being so as to transform 
themselves’ (Foucault, 1988, p.18).  
 
I have argued that the genealogical approach provides the lens for distortions to come 
to focus, through the examination of autobiographical narratives. It goes without 
saying however, that genealogy has not come to operate on deserted and unexplored 
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territories. Various feminist theorists have long argued that recent theoretical debates 
concerning ‘the self' and ‘the subject’ become particularly interesting, when examined 
in relation to lived and/or written lives and have stressed the importance of 
autobiographical narratives in illuminating the conditions of possibility for the female 
self in education to emerge (Smith and Watson, 1998). However, deviating from the 
feminist tradition of locating similarities in the textual representation of women 
teachers’ experiences, I have opted for the unveiling of their situated differences, 
drawing upon feminist theorizations that have seen the female self as multiple, 
fragmented and incomplete (de Lauretis, 1987). It is within this theoretical 
cartography, that I have found ‘a landscape’ (Steedman, 1986) for a feminist 
genealogy drawing on women teachers' autobiographical narratives to be deployed 
and it is on some details of this landscape that I will now focus.  
 
Foucault’s work has been influential in the theorisation of the social nature of 
spatiality and its interdependent relation with power and subjectivity. Feminist 
theorists have further explored the role of space and place in the performance of 
gender and sexuality (Rose, 1993). Drawing on the theoretical encounter between 
feminism with and Foucault, I have examined the ways women’s longing for some 
space of their own has been intensely inscribed in their practices of self 
representation. Clearly this is not the place to attempt a rigorous genealogy of women 
teachers’ narratives. What follows is a series of vignettes, which trace the emergence 
of what I have called technologies of space  (Tamboukou, 1999).  
 
When my trunk was landed, I was shown my room. This was some twelve feet 
square on the ground-floor, with one small window flush with the pavement, a 
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narrow bed, a scrap of carpet, a basket chair, one upright chair and a bureau. A 
fire crackled in the hearth. ‘Is this mine?’ [emphasis in the text] cried I in 
ecstasy. (Hughes, 1946:120) 
 
This is an extract from the autobiography of Molly Hughes, a student having just 
arrived in Cambridge for a new teacher’s training college. It seems that well before 
Virginia Woolf’s influential lectures at Girton and Newnham in 1928, where she 
related women’s writing with economic independence and ‘a room of one’s own’ 
(Woolf, 1945), women teachers had been seriously preoccupied with the deep 
necessity of acquiring a space where they could think of and for themselves, articulate 
their intellectual worries, ultimately ‘write themselves’. Contrary to prevailing 
perceptions that women were restricted in the private sphere of the family and sought 
to enter the public sphere through educating themselves, the genealogical analysis of 
their autobiographical narratives reveals that women have fought equally strongly to 
reclaim their right to privacy as well as their right to be public. Their narratives have 
also revealed that in reclaiming space for themselves, women have imagined 
themselves in different spaces and not infrequently have sought to fulfil their ‘dreams 
of elsewhere’ by travelling:  
 
Donald, wouldn’t you like to go to America, Canada or the great wide west? 
where perhaps there might be more chance of finding out what manner of 
being you were? - where there is more room, more freedom, and one is not so 
hide-bound by conventions - where you could get nearer the soil, and as I said 
before not be stifled by artificialities and habits and conventions, your own 
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and other peoples’. Oh wouldn’t you like it, wouldn’t you? Wouldn’t you? 
(Grier, 1937:34) 
 
This extract comes from a letter written in August 1902, by Winifred Mercier, a 
woman teacher who later became a leader in the reform of teacher training colleges, 
to her friend and fellow teacher Jeanne K. Borland, Donald for her friends. While on 
school holidays, studying for her external London degree and looking after her sick 
mother, Winifred finds consolation in writing to her beloved friend. Her passionate 
desire for travel brings together a cluster of practices that are interwoven in the 
fashioning of women teachers’ life style. Travel is a means of getting away from the 
‘artificialities and habits and conventions’ that are imposed both internally and 
externally, ‘your own and other people’s’, travel to ‘where there is more room, more 
freedom’, in order to seek ‘the manner of being you were’. 
 
Women teachers’ autobiographical narratives have indeed been inscribed by spatial 
images, both real and imagined. In reading these narratives, I was intrigued by the 
multifarious ways that they have tried to work upon themselves in rearranging their 
space, and giving different dimensions to the unfolding of their lives. Indeed I would 
argue that technologies of the female self are historically associated with [delete: 
what I have called] technologies of space.  
 
Women teachers’ textual narratives have also revealed how by entering the first 
university associated colleges, these women lived within the limits of their society, 
but also beyond them, in yet unrecognised ‘different social spaces’, that Foucault 
(1988) has described as heterotopias. In Foucault’s analyses of space, heterotopias 
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contest the real space in which we live, creating transitional spaces and sheltering 
subjects in crisis. In writing their stories, women have indeed presented their colleges 
as spaces of ‘transition and tension’, ‘sites outside of society’ bringing together, 
‘heterogeneous discourses’ - equal opportunities, male educational and ethical values, 
lady-like behaviour - for the development of young women. Thus, the notion of 
heterotopia has become instrumental in the analyses of women teachers’ space 
narratives. (Tamboukou, 1999, 2000). Depicted as heterotopias, the pioneering 
colleges of women’s Higher Education opened up  channels to the exploration of the 
self and gave women access to knowledge, but also to power, ‘a pas de deux dance’ 
they had no choice but following. In the genealogical analysis of women’s narratives, 
it was not so much the effects of power that were important, but the subjective 
capacities that were being developed in the attempt to resist the power that had made 
women what they were. As their narratives reveal, it is no wonder why some of these 
resisting practices were deployed against the disciplinary arrangement of their space: 
 
The Mistress’s sitting-room and the library, where lectures were given and 
which was also our common room, were on the ground floor, and the dining-
room was in the basement, a bare ugly room with two tables, at one of which 
we students sat, while the Mistress and her friends sat at the ‘High table’ 
alongside. It was at first expected  that we should sit in a formal row down one 
side of our table, lest we should be guilty of the discourtesy of turning our 
backs upon the ‘High’. But this was too much and we rebelled, quietly ignored 
rule and insisted upon comfortably facing each other. (Lumsden, 1933:47) 
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Women teachers’ autobiographical narratives forcefully depict colleges as contested 
sites, ridden by contradictions and uncertainties. In such a context of controversy, the 
techniques women used to map their existence would be a nexus of resistance and 
accommodation practices, inextricably interwoven. It was through these technologies 
of resistance (Tamboukou, 1999) that women began to fashion new forms of 
subjectivity always oscillating between what Milan Kundera (1984) would describe as 
the ‘unbearable lightness and heaviness of being’, by adopting unstable positions 
between them. 
 
In making my argument about the role of women’s self writings, as technologies of 
the female self, I have drawn on influential feminist analyses of women’s strategies 
for writing the self. These analyses have explored the historical devaluation of 
women’s writings that have both constrained their writing practices and have 
excluded them from the canon of traditional autobiographical texts. These analyses 
have further shown how, moving beyond silence, women began making sense of 
dispersed moments of their existence, and through writing they attempted to describe 
those moments and articulate them in a narrative system. I have been particularly 
interested in feminist analyses of women’s autobiographies, memoirs, letters and 
diaries as practices of self-formation, the argument that the female self constitutes 
itself through writing (Smith and Watson 1998, 2001). The selves that are inscribed in 
their autobiographical narratives lack the sense of organic integrity and question the 
principle of authorial intention that characterises the male canon of the genre. It is this 
elusive condition of their textual existence that renders female autobiographical 
narratives provocative for the genealogist of technologies of the female self. 
 
 37 
As already indicated, my particular interest in exploring the technologies of the self of 
women teachers, relates to my own experience as a woman teacher but it goes beyond the 
‘personal sphere’. Education has been a site of power where freedom has been 
historically denied to women. It has therefore been a significant locus of resistance. Jana 
Sawicki (1991) has pointed out that genealogy as resistance opens the way for a 
‘historical knowledge of struggles’, since it uses history to give voice to the marginal and 
submerged subjects which lie ‘hidden from history’ and focuses attention on specific 
situations, thus leading to more concrete analyses of particular struggles. What I have 
suggested is that women seeking freedom through and within education have attempted 
not only to disrupt power relations and transcend gendered hierarchical structures, but 
also to reinvent themselves and live a better life. The genealogical analysis of women 
teachers’ autobiographical narratives has not articulated a closed answer in response to 
the initial research questions. The Foucauldian toolbox of genealogy has given me the 
means to pursue my explorations of technologies of the female self, in women’s practices 
of self representation, but has also acted as a source of continuous uncertainty about what 
I thought had been my ‘results’ or conclusions. Instead of finding  answers, I have rather 
found new questions which I hope will continue to shake up our perceptions of what we 
are, what  this present of ours is, but also and perhaps most importantly how we can 
become other than what we are already. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1. I am indebted to Lumka Daniel for many discussions about and insights into the 
story forms used by people in this study.  
